Missile Defense Matters — So Does Explaining It

Missile defense policy has received renewed attention due to the Trump administration’s “Golden Dome for America,” a new initiative aimed at countering a range of high-end missile threats to the U.S. homeland, including from major powers such as Russia and China. At an Oval Office event, President Trump announced that the system would be “fully operational” by the end of his term in 2029, with an estimated cost of $175 billion, and that he would appoint U.S. Space Force General Michael Guetlein to spearhead the effort.

The reorientation of U.S. missile defense policy and posture towards countering next-generation threats is both necessary and prudent. The effort will falter, however, if it does not align the strategic ends, ways, and means—and effectively communicate that alignment to the public.

The Strategic Logic of Limited Missile Defense

For decades, U.S. homeland missile defense policy has been guided by a deliberate choice to focus on deterring threats from rogue nations, rather than near-peer competitors. The underlying assumption of this choice was that countries like Iran and North Korea, with their limited inventories of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could reach the U.S. homeland, could be effectively countered without undermining strategic stability with Russia and China.

A relatively modest missile defense posture was sufficient to defend against these threats, while avoiding the perception that the U.S. sought to neutralize the retaliatory capabilities of its near-peer competitors. These assumptions have shaped the current structure of U.S. missile defense. Homeland defenses have remained primarily focused on countering ICBMs, while regional or theater defenses have been tailored to address a wider variety of threats, including cruise missiles and other complex threats.

The Threat

The strategic environment has shifted. The United States is now in an era of great power competition, where adversaries have heavily invested in next-generation missile technologies and employed them extensively in recent conflicts such as Ukraine. Their threshold for use has proven to be low, and their availability and proliferation are pretty high. In short, these tools have become “weapons of choice” for adversaries and allies alike.

Many of these systems are specifically designed to exploit the limitations of existing U.S. homeland missile defense systems. Cruise missiles can underfly ground-based radars, evading detection and thereby reducing the window for interception. Hypersonic weapons pose a dual challenge: they travel at speeds comparable to ballistic missiles, but with the added complexity of low-altitude flight and mid-flight maneuverability. Their less predictable trajectories make them more complex to track and more challenging to defeat. Additionally, commercially available drones have demonstrated growing lethality, having been used by both allies and adversaries to inflict significant damage on high-value targets, including bombers and air defense systems.

These threats are likely to continue to evolve in both sophistication and scale over the next decade. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran will continue to invest in emerging technologies to bolster their ability to impose costs on the United States and hold the U.S. homeland at risk.

Each of these technologies poses unique detection, tracking, and interception challenges—but they are not invincible. Existing technologies can counter them, and the United States is investing in advanced capabilities to stay ahead of the threat. The Golden Dome is one path forward—an effort to build a layered, resilient missile defense architecture capable of responding to this new strategic era.

Plated or Solid Gold?

Homeland defense has received an average of 12 percent of annual air and missile defense funding since 2009—a reflection of earlier priorities that focused on limited ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran. Meanwhile, near-peer competitors have spent considerable resources investing in next-generation missile technologies, while the U.S. response has suffered from years of inattention.

Through the Golden Dome initiative, the Trump administration has attempted to reverse this trend. The July 2025 reconciliation bill earmarked $18.5 billion for next-generation missile technologies, $5.913 billion for layered homeland defense, and $16.58 billion for enhancement of resources for munitions and defense supply chain resiliency. These investments represent an initial down payment on the broader strategic effort.

For this recent momentum to translate into lasting capability, it will require sustained, bipartisan political commitment. To garner this support, the strategic logic of investing in homeland missile defense must be more effectively communicated to both policymakers and the public.

The Critics

Some critics of Golden Dome have argued that it would upend strategic stability by undermining the principle of mutually assured destruction. They argue that investing in a robust homeland missile defense capability could lead our near-peer competitors to perceive that the United States is invulnerable to a retaliatory strike. This perceived invulnerability would strengthen Russian and Chinese incentives to preemptively strike the United States or develop novel delivery systems designed to evade U.S. defenses.

This line of reasoning overlooks the reality that through their pursuit of next-generation missile technologies, expansion of offensive capabilities, and weaponization of space, China and Russia have reshaped the strategic environment. The low threshold for use of conventionally armed missiles for coercive attacks points to the specter of non-nuclear strategic attack. These actions have compelled the United States to respond to preserve its ability to deter its near-peer competitors. As General Christopher J. Mahoney noted in his nomination hearing, “comprehensive missile defeat and the United States nuclear arsenal are complementary and mutually reinforcing.”

Russia and China are incentivized to loudly decry U.S. missile defense efforts as destabilizing. It is difficult to accept this narrative that these investments are the root cause of their decisions to expand offensive capabilities. It seems particularly disingenuous for China to accuse the United States of singlehandedly destabilizing the strategic environment while simultaneously showcasing its full nuclear triad for the first time in September’s Victory Day parade and refusing to engage in arms control discussions.  

Another critique of Golden Dome is that it may be prohibitively expensive. Further scrutiny has been directed at the proposal to develop a constellation of space-based interceptors, with critics drawing parallels to Brilliant Pebbles. However, recent advances in both satellite launch affordability and electronic miniaturization may have shifted the affordability calculus. As space becomes an increasingly contested warfighting domain, it’s worth reassessing the feasibility of space-based interceptors to determine whether they now represent a necessary cost to bear.

Nevertheless, the successful development and deployment of these technologies will require sustained investment and commitment across administrations. Otherwise, there is a risk that ambitious research and development efforts could stall, falling short of their potential due to funding gaps or shifting priorities.  

The Trump administration has signaled its parallel commitment to nuclear modernization and arms control. As Golden Dome architects move forward, they would benefit from examining the challenges of the Sentinel nuclear modernization program, which has encountered severe schedule delays and cost overruns. The program’s cost overruns were driven by overly ambitious delivery timelines, system design flaws, and a stagnant industrial base.

To confront next-generation threats, the U.S. must invest in long-term research and development efforts; however, in the short term, emphasis should be placed on procuring existing capabilities to counter the full spectrum of today’s threats. Recent air defense engagements in Ukraine, Israel, and the Red Sea have demonstrated that missile defense technologies are mature and battle-proven. To capitalize on these capabilities, accelerating production of existing systems, alongside targeted investment in research and development (R&D), will be critical. The goal should be to deliver real capability, not just a portfolio of underdeveloped R&D projects that fail to meet operational needs.  

Golden Dome is not a silver bullet, but it represents a necessary evolution in U.S. missile defense policy. Its success will depend on strategic clarity, sustained investment, and the ability to translate technological ambition into operational reality.

Aligning Ends, Ways, and Means

Missile defense is not a panacea. It won’t win a war, nor will it prevent one on its own. In the event of a conflict, it certainly won’t intercept 100% of incoming enemy missiles. But perfection is not the standard for strategic value.

Given the evolving threat posed by our near-peer competitors, investing in a next-generation missile defense architecture for the homeland is a worthwhile venture. The strategic logic of homeland missile defense uses two forms of deterrence: denial and punishment.

Deterrence by denial involves convincing adversaries that it would be extremely costly, if not impossible, to achieve their aims, as a significant portion of their missiles would be intercepted, rendering the strike ineffective. Deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, signals that any attack would result in significant cost imposition, because enough U.S. military capability would survive to enable a credible retaliatory response. These two mechanisms complicate adversary calculations by undermining confidence of success, reinforcing consequences of aggression, and thus raising the threshold for initiating conflict.  

Missile defense can also increase opportunities for de-escalation. Consider the aftermath of Operation Midnight Hammer, where U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities prompted a retaliatory ballistic missile attack against Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. U.S. and Qatari forces successfully intercepted the attack, resulting in no casualties, and marking the largest one-day engagement in the history of the Patriot system. The successful defense allowed Iran to save face while giving the United States space to offer a diplomatic off-ramp and avoid further escalation.

Moreover, in periods of crisis, time is a strategic asset. Extending these windows through the detection or interception of incoming threats can provide policymakers with the critical time needed to assess options, prevent miscalculations, and end the conflict through other means.

The homeland missile defense architecture does not need to be impenetrable to achieve strategic effects and contribute to deterrence and broader U.S. defense goals. In an era of intensifying strategic competition, a layered defense system could limit damage, impose costs on adversaries, support de-escalation, and buy critical time for decision-makers. Communicating this strategic logic will enable policymakers to garner the necessary support and political buy-in to effectively respond to the threat and successfully reorient missile defense policy for years to come.

Patrycja Bazylczyk is a program manager and research associate with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.